We present a novel approach t o the challenging issue of database con dential data protection. We adopt the decision tree framework as our baseline and extend it to cope with databases where the class label attribute is not speci ed. We are interested in con dential data that are randomly distributed over di erent attributes referred to as multi-dimensional inference. For condential data protection, our method referred to as adaptive modi cation mitigates inference by evaluating and modifying some, not all, relevant data records. We localize data modi cation in a decision tree and, instead of exhaustively evaluating all modi cation possibilities, we select informative data to modify. Our proposed method is e ective in protection of con dential data and scalable for handling large databases.
INTRODUCTION
Safeguarding con dential data of a database has been a challenging issue in the past and emerges as one of the most critical information technologies today. The pressing demand for such a protection technique is partly due to the trend of information sharing between institutions and among coalition members, and the opening of the government databases to the public. The problem that arises when con dential information can be derived from released data by unauthorized users is commonly called the database inference problem.
Many of today's e orts in con dentiality protection have been geared towards modifying to-be-released data in order to mitigate inference. Methods of modication include perturbation 4 i.e., alteration of an attribute value to a new value, blocking 2 13 i.e., replacement of an existing attribute value with a ?" indicating ignorance, and aggregation i.e., combination of several values into one coarser category 14 . These modi cations are made on the basis of a probabilistic model 2 5 , decision tree 1 , association rules 6 7 or the rough set theory 10 .
Our goal is to lay a sound theoretical foundation for con dential data protection. In this paper, we develop inference prevention methods on the basis of a decision tree framework 12 . The decision tree method conveniently provides a more localized description of data records. The structure of the tree may easily be traced back to individual instances, and the e ect of the modi cation of particular instances on decision making is more clear. It also delivers excellent performance against many benchmark test datasets 12 . In 1 , we applied the decision tree method as our baseline approach to the inference problem, where con dential data were represented as values of the class label attribute of the test data. However, con dential data may be composed of data from di erent sources and may not be restricted to one attribute i.e., the class label. It is cases in which con dential data are distributed over the entire database referred to here as multidimensional inference that interest us. In this paper, we extend the decision tree method in order to handle distributed con dential data.
Decision theoretical-based approaches often su er from the inability to scale-up to cope with large databases. What limits these approaches the most is not the intricate decision analysis required, but the exhaustive evaluation of the entire databases in a repeated manner during the modi cation process. Our approach adopts an adaptive modi cation strategy which gives e ective performance and desirable results.
INFERENCE PROBLEM
We consider a simple two-leveled security protocol 8 which has High and Low users. The High users e.g., the database manager view the entire database, and the Low users share the High view with the exception of any con dential data. When data are shared, High releases some of the non-con dential data to Low.
Authors of 11 have i n troduced a conceptual model for database inference and discussed the necessary steps involved in dealing with the inference problem. High generates rules from the available data set, and then determines whether there is inference. If the inference is excessive, then it implements a protection plan to lessen the inference i.e., decides to modify by deleting certain data from the database as it appears to Low. In fact, many database inference papers have alluded to our inference model. The output of our inference model is the database that can be released to Low. Our goal is to make modi cations as parsimoniously as possible and thus avoid imposing unnecessary changes which lessen functionality.
Decision Tree Method
Our analysis of data protection is based on C4.5 decision tree 12 . The C4.5 decision tree uses an information theoretic test to evaluate the quality of decision tree generation. It classi es a new data record by assigning it the class label possessed by the majority o f data records that are at the same leaf node i.e., the end of a branch where a class label is assigned of the decision tree as the new data record. By convention, the attribute used as the class label is deterministic. To deal with multi-dimensional inference, we e v aluate the possibility of inference on an arbitrary attribute by designating it as the class label thereby the original class label becomes an ordinary attribute.
In our method, attributes that contain con dential data are viewed as the class labels of the testing data, and the remainder of the database is considered non-con dential. In 1 , the database inference problem was viewed as traditional decision tree learning, and the prevention of database inference dealt exclusively with attribute values of the training data which are only part of the non-con dential data. Con dential data were associated with only one attribute i.e., the class label. Inference prevention that structured in this way is clearly insu cient. In this paper, we take into account the entire body of non-con dential data 2.2 Metric Table 1 shows an instant view of a relational data table.
Modi cation results in placing perhaps more ?"s in the database. At this instant, one of the M attributes has been selected as the class label. Data modi cation is likely to incur degradation of database performance. In our approach, important performance metrics include the e ectiveness measure of con dential data protection E and the measure of the loss of functionality F in a database. In terms of the decision tree method, the e ectiveness measure for the attribute currently selected as the class label is determined by the classi cation error of the test data i.e. the con dential data, while the measure of loss of functionality is a function of the classi cation error of the training data i.e. the to-be-released data.
Suppose the jth attribute is posted as the class label.
Let the measure of protection e ectiveness with respect to the jth attribute be denoted as E j and the measure of the loss of functionality be denoted as F j . The overall measure of E and F for the entire database are the function e.g.,weighted average of E i s and F i s. The measure F is usually has an upper bound of a given threshold i.e., F that represents the maximum level of information loss that users are willing to tolerate. With the de nitions of E and F in mind, our optimization goal is to 3
Minimize E, while keeping F ; i.e., we optimize E with F as the objective function.
Note that the e ect of protection is evaluated from High's perspective, while the database functionality i s evaluated from Low's view.
ADAPTIVE MODIFICATION
Our adaptive strategy exploits the property of localization inherent to the decision tree method and modi es not all attribute values, but rather only selected ones. We examine the leaf nodes of a decision tree and study the statistics of the data records at di erent leaf nodes. By restricting modi cation to a small area of the database, our approach preserves the database functionality. During modi cation, we visit the attribute that contains the largest number of con dential data records and receives the lowest classi cation error i.e., the highest inference threat. With this selected attribute in mind, we examine the distribution of associated con dential data and modify the leaf node that has the highest population. Clearly, our search strategy may not yield an overall optimal solution. However, the controlled modi cation scheme can e ectively avoid the high computational complexity incurred by exhaustive search. 1 We will describe our modi cation procedures at three levels in the following sections.
Selection of Attributes
Let the total number of con dential attribute values be denoted as S, the number of total attribute values be D, and the classi cation error of the test data with respect to the jth attribute be C e r r j . At the rst level, we select from all the M attributes the one that maximizes the product of the number of associated condential data records and the inverse of the classi cation error U attr = max 1 , C e r r j T E j S where T E j is the number test data associated with the jth attribute. Suppose attribute A j is selected. Thus, A j is posted as the class label and denoted as C j .
Selection of A Leaf Node
For the given C j , w e decide among all leaf nodes from the corresponding decision tree, DT j , a leaf node to visit. The selection of the leaf node is determined, at least, by 1 the number of correctly labeled training data records at a leaf, and 2 the number of correctly classi ed test data records at a leaf. Less correctly labeled training data implies that less e ort is required to alter the present class label at a leaf node. On the other hand, the more correctly classi ed test records are, the higher the e ect in protection is from modifying the leaf node. Let the selected leaf node be denoted as L k and the immediate attribute i.e., the last attribute on the branch of L k beA i . With L k and C j in mind, we record the following statistical information: R j : training records w.r.t. C j E j : testing records w.r.t. C j T r : correctly labeled training records at L k T e : correctly classi ed testing records at L k F r : incorrectly labeled training records at L k F e : incorrectly classi ed testing records at L k With these statistical information, the utility function that combines the above t wo factors is as follows:
We need information about the data distribution of the neighbors i.e., leaf nodes of di erent v alues of A i of L k . At A i , w e store the relationship of data records to its fellow leaf nodes as the ratio a1 : a2 : ::: : al, for l di erent values of A i . Furthermore, those leaf nodes with the same class label as L k will be collectively denoted as a + and those with di erent labels be a , .
Selection of Modi cation Methods
At the leaf node L k , our strategy to mitigate inference involve t wo aspects: S1 Reduce the correctly classi ed test records. S2 Reduce the correctly labeled training records. The result of S1 is expected to produce higher classication error of the test data, while the result of S2 may cause the change of the value of the class label at L k and thus, a ect the outcome of decision analysis.
To implement our strategy, we envision the following three For the purpose of minimizing the impact of modi cation, in both I1 and I3, we localize changes by replacing only those values of the immediate attribute i.e., A i with ?"s. 2 In I2, the values of the class label of some training data records are blocked. As a consequence, a training data record with its class label being blocked will be excluded from the training data set. Item S2 is carried out by implementing I2 and I3, while item S1 consists only of I1. In both I1 and I3, we increase the uncertainty of classi cation by m o ving or, redistributing correct testing and training data records to neighboring leaf nodes. In both I2 and I3, the e ort is to make the number of incorrectly labeled training records to outnumber incorrectly labeled ones. The di erence between I2 and I3 is that the e ect of I3 depends upon the distribution of data records in the neighborhood of L k . Unlike I2, I1 and I3 are intended to 'smear' data records of neighbor leaf nodes.
The choice between the three modi cation methods will depend on an estimation of the computational cost and gain in con dentiality, where the cost refers to the total number of modi cations executed and the gain refers to the number of data records whose class labels have been successfully altered. that used to be correct now become incorrect, where a, a++a, is the ratio of the number of re-distributed test records will receive incorrect label. Summing the loss and the gain yields the net loss of I1, which i s a, a++a, T e .
I2. For I2, the condition of applicability is that T r and F r are close. Because the removal of the class label of a training record results in deletion, the cost of I2 is T r ,F r +1, meaning that the amount of removal is determined by the di erence between T r and F r . After deletion, the associated class label of L k will change. This means there are T e test records that will change to a wrong class sign and F e test records that will change to the correct one. So, the gain is T e , F e . Note that if T e F e , modi cation of L k is avoided. The net loss for I2 is therefore, T r , F r + 1 , T e , F e .
I3. For I3, the applicability is the same as I2. As in the case of I1, modi cation will be restricted to the value of the nearest attribute i.e., A i . The gain that arises from applying I3 is also T e , F e as that of I2. However, the calculation of the cost is more involved, because a modi ed training record will become an uncertain evidence whose impact or, weight will be distributed among di erent v alues i.e., leaf nodes of A i . The number of changes denoted as c needed to alter the associated class label can be iteratively determined by
In this case, the cost of I3 is c. By putting together the cost and the gain, the net loss of I3 can be obtained as c , T e , F e . 
Control
Step By comparing the net losses of the three approaches, we pick the modi cation method with the minimum loss. Modi cation hides one attribute value at a time until either the leaf node is exhausted or the threshold of allowed modi cations of the present class label is reached, where the threshold of modi cation is determined according to the ratio of number of con dential values that is with this particular attribute i.e., the class label and with other attributes. After modi cation is carried out, we compute E and F and determine whether or not F exceeds the given threshold. If it does not, our modi cation procedures will be repeated from the top level.
DISCUSSION
Decision theoretical-based approaches to con dential data protection have been widely pursued by researchers from di erent elds. Exhaustive e v aluation incurs extremely high computational complexity and hence, impedes the scalability of existing approaches. We presented an adaptive modi cation method with a basis in the decision tree framework. The transparency of decision trees make them an excellent tool for analyzing how speci c data modi cations may a ect inference possibilities. Our adaptive strategy selects and modies the most informative attribute values, with information about statistical distribution obtained from decision tree analysis, to e ectively and parsimoniously handle the database inference problem. Furthermore, it localizes modi cation operations in a manner that preserves database performance. our proposed method, we are able to obtain satisfactory results in terms of performance and protection. We are presently experimenting with some data sets from UCI repositories e.g., 9 and will test various KDD databases. We h a ve tested methods of exhaustive search, single-attribute-valued best-rst search 5 , and our informative modi cation.
Complexity

Evaluation
As mentioned, our evaluation of con dential data protection is based on the average of the classi cation error of the test data i.e., the modi ed non-con dential data with respect to each class label. We justify the proposed approach b y comparing the results with those obtained from a best-rst search. With the well-known voting records dataset 9 , the proposed approach selects and modi es attribute values of test records with the modi cation method I1 being chosen. The results of modi cation is close to those obtained from the bestrst search. For instance, with 20 con dential attribute values, in the best-rst search the classi cation error increases from 5.26 to 57.90 with 11 modi cations. The proposed adaptive modi cation selects 9, that are part of the 11, modi cations. The modi cation method I2 is likely to be selected in the case that a leaf node is associated with a small number of training records, but a large number of test data records. The adaptive modi cation was motivated by our experiments with best-rst search and thus, the performance of our proposed selection strategy is expected to be very close to the performance of the best-rst strategy on the voting record data. In addition to the reduction of computational complexity, the adaptive modi cation avoid unnecessary modi cations, which can be a large quantity, at the beginning and towards the end of selection that the best-rst strategy may face due to the ineffectiveness of the data selection criterion under certain conditions.
Restoration
An attacker may know our inference prevention strategy. As a result, modi ed attribute values can be restored and hence, con dential data are not correctly protected. We perform experiments in which the remaining unhidden attribute values were used to infer the attribute values that had been hidden in our rst experiment. In term of voting data, the result shows that the previously hidden attribute values e.g., physician fee freeze" are restored by using some other attributes e.g., El Salvador aid". In the wake of the possibility of modi ed values being restored, we repeat the process of attribute value hiding, making previously hidden attributes con dential, until restoration risk goes below a speci ed threshold. The need of repeated hiding referred to as the rami cation problem of database inference 2 presents a challenge to the value suppression e.g., blocking modi cation strategy. We will explore the restoration and other types of attacks in our future work.
FUTURE WORK
Our present blocking-based modi cation may not be the most e ective means of modifying data. We will also experiment with perturbation method. We have not yet discussed the value-restoration problem, in which an attacker might restore blocked values in the same manner that he restores con dential data. Also, we did not discuss particular numerical values which might b e assigned to the tolerance level. We leave these issues as part of our future work.
Our evaluation of the proposed method is based on empirical study by comparing it with di erent decision tree approaches. We will evaluate it against other existing method based on di erent frameworks for microdata suppression.
